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 A B S T R A C T  
The study aims to obtain empirical evidence for the effect of personality on the impact 
of compensation received by CEO in Indonesia toward CEO voluntary turnover. This 
study uses two sources of data, primary and secondary. The research population con-
sists of all president directors (as a proxy of the CEOs) of companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The data on CEO turnover were collected manually by 
tracing the names of the Director stated on the company's annual report. To determine 
whether CEO turnover was involuntary or coercive, this research examined the 
growth of the company in which the CEO turnover occurred after the CEO had served 
a minimum of three consecutive years. Test result on the relationship between com-
pensation and turnover indicates that compensation is not strong enough to explain 
voluntary CEO turnover. Only the control variables included in the model (earnings, 
returns and ROA) can explain statistically the relationship between compensation and 
turnover. The result of these two tests (hypothesis one and two) indicates that com-
pensation is not strong enough to explain voluntary turnover.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendapatkan bukti empiris pengaruh kepribadian dan 
dampak kompensasi yang diterima CEO di Indonesia terhadap CEO voluntary turno-
ver. Penelitian ini menggunakan dua sumber data, primer dan sekunder. Populasi 
penelitian terdiri dari semua presiden direktur (sebagai proxy CEO) dari perusahaan 
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Data tentang CEO turnover dikumpulkan 
secara manual dengan menelusuri nama-nama Direktur yang menyatakan laporan 
tahunan perusahaan. Untuk menentukan apakah CEO turnover adalah disengaja atau 
terpaksa, penelitian ini meneliti pertumbuhan perusahaan di mana CEO turonver 
terjadi setelah CEO menjabat minimal tiga tahun berturut-turut. Hasil pengujian 
pada hubungan antara kompensasi dan turnover menunjukkan bahwa kompensasi 
tidak cukup kuat untuk menjelaskan CEO voluntary turnover. Hanya variabel kontrol 
dalam model (pendapatan, pengembalian dan ROA) dapat menjelaskan secara statistik 
hubungan antara kompensasi dan turnover. Hasil dua tes ini (hipotesis satu dan dua) 
menunjukkan bahwa kompensasi tidak cukup kuat untuk menjelaskan voluntary 
turnover.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
So far, studies dealing with the effect of personality 
have not yet been considered having enough evi-
dence, especially on the impact of compensation 
received by CEO in Indonesia toward CEO volun-
tary turnover. This study has focused on the two-
tier board system adopted in Indonesia, consisted 
in a separation between the board of commission 
and the board of director in the corporate gover-
nance structure (Tumbuan 2005). In addition, the 
two-tier board system is adopted in many continen-
tal European countries, such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and China. 
Rinaldi Firmansyah, Telkom's President Direc-
tor was appointed in 2007. He, previously, served 
as President Director of Bahana Securities. In 2008, 
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his income was recorded at Rp7.53 billion or ap-
proximately Rp627.5 million per month. Another 
one is Agus Martowardoyo, who, previously, 
served as President Director of Bank Mandiri. He 
was the President Director of Bank Permata, until 
2005. Following his leadership, the bank expe-
rienced a significant increase in performance so that 
in 2008 there was 11.06% salary increase for direc-
tors. In the financial statements of the Bank in 2008, 
an average of He brings home income more than 
Rp6.6 billion for 2008. This issue raises the ques-
tion, whether the executives in Indonesia moved to 
a new company to obtain better compensation, as 
described and predicted labor theory to the execu-
tive? 
(https://indonesiacompanynews.wordpress.com/
daftar-gaji-pejabat-tinggi/daftar-gaji-bos-bumn/). 
In fact, the result of study in the area of 
compensation and CEO turnover remains to be on 
the process. In the previous study, compensation 
has been used as an antecedent of voluntary CEO 
turnover, such as in the study of Hadlock and Lu-
mer (1997) and Takahashi (2006). Hadlock and Lu-
mer (1997) stated that compensation had an impor-
tant power during the testing period they had 
done. Compensation granted based on pay for per-
formance would eventually determine CEO‟s de-
sire whether to survive and become loyal to the 
company or to leave the company, along with the 
CEO‟s confidence in having the opportunity to ob-
tain better compensation in the labor market. 
Moreover, some researchers stated that beha-
vioral factor is considered an important variable 
influencing the patterns of thinking and individual 
perspective on certain issues. Also, some research-
ers such as Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988), Datta 
and Guthrie (1994), and Fredrickson et al. (1988) 
stated that most of the time, research only analyzed 
profoundly the factors influencing executive turno-
ver from the company's performance side. Those 
researchers suggested including more factors inhe-
rent to the CEO individual. In relation to this issue, 
Fredrickson et al. (1988) suggested to present social 
and political factors to predict the turnover of CEO. 
Datta and Guthrie (1994) suggested including the 
demographic characteristics of the CEO in the 
group in examining the relationship among some 
antecedents on the CEO turnover. Thus, the main 
research question posed in this study is whether 
CEOs‟ personality influences the relationship be-
tween compensation and CEO‟s perception for de-
ciding to leave the company voluntarily? 
This study also conducted an endurance test 
using secondary data on the value of the compensa-
tion received by the CEO on the turnover. The re-
sult of the test is used to explain the effect of perso-
nality on the impact of compensation on the turno-
ver. In fact, the labor market theory states that the 
market will give greater rewards to the CEO who 
has more capabilities (especially the specific capa-
bilities) than those who do not. However, this 
study assumes that not all CEOs consider that the 
amount of compensation they receive is identical 
with the capabilities they have. This study argues 
that not all CEOs consider compensation value that 
they receive reflect their capabilities. Ellig (2007) 
stated that compensation not only in terms of mon-
ey (extrinsic), but could also be in the form of non-
material rewards (intrinsic) such as promotion, 
employment going concern, the extent of work au-
tonomy, respect from the owners and so forth. 
Hence, the compensation granted by the company 
to the CEO becomes the single determinant in the 
CEO‟s consideration to leave the company. The 
second research question of this study is whether 
compensation has an impact on CEO turnover in 
Indonesia? 
This study is expected to provide a new point 
of view on the relationship between compensation 
variable and CEO turnover, by including personali-
ty as a moderating variable. In relation to this ef-
fort, Zimmerman (2008) described that it is impor-
tant to understand theoretically the relationship 
between personality types and the CEO turnover. 
When incorporating personality factor, this study 
can confirm the findings of previous studies which 
still showed various results. Thus, this study has 
also shown empirical evidence that on the overall 
sample of the CEO, the amount of compensation 
literally encourages voluntary turnover, although it 
is not statistically significant. The finding also indi-
cates that CEO‟s personality elaborates the decision 
to leave the company when the compensation be-
comes a basic consideration. Therefore, this study 
has been successful to find a reason why previous 
studies have not found enough evidence of the rela-
tionship between compensation and CEO turnover, 
when using only secondary data. 
This study can contribute to three sides; theo-
retical, methodological, and practical. In terms of 
the theoretical side, this study can enrich the theory 
of the labor market for executives with an empirical 
finding that personality factor should be consi-
dered as a contingent factor when market would 
like to offer executives (especially the CEO) with a 
certain compensation value. From the methodolog-
ical point of view, this study can also a database of 
CEO turnovers in Indonesia for 11 periods (1999-
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2009), and determine the voluntary CEO turnovers 
which were determined by assessing the compa-
ny‟s performance for three years before the change 
occurred. Finally, in the perspective of practical 
side, this study has provided empirical evidence 
that in the decision to move in or out of the compa-
ny (voluntarily) made by the CEO of the company, 
the compensation is not an important considera-
tion. This study has found that CEO‟s personality 
affects CEO's decision to leave voluntarily. Perhaps 
eastern culture embraced by the majority of Indo-
nesian people, including among executives, the 
compensation is not the only measure of apprecia-
tion. Respect, familiarity, and warmth are felt from 
the work environment and they can be the primary 
choice for the decision. This is made to withstand in 
the company. 
This study is presented as follows: back-
ground, as what has been done previously; theoret-
ical foundation, study of literature, and subse-
quently will be used for developing hypothesis; 
research methods that will describe the data and 
sample used in this study, the study models and 
statistical tools that are used and also the explana-
tion of study variables. At the end, there will be a 
discussion about the hypothesis testing result, and 
the further point that consists of a review of the 
conclusions, implications, and limitations and sug-
gestions for further study. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency theory is the grand theory describing the 
interaction (even often in the form of a conflict) 
between the owner and the management. In agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), it is stated that, 
among the parties concerned such as the owner and 
the management, there has been asymmetric in-
formation since the public company made the sepa-
ration between the two. Also, in terms of the issue 
of the CEO turnover, Agency theory has been 
found as a very relevant theory to explain the deci-
sion of CEO turnover, either voluntarily or not. It 
further encourages the owner to form an agreement 
(contract) with the CEO as a tool to direct the ac-
tions of the CEO in order to perform activities that 
lead to the improvement of the owner‟s welfare. 
Agency theory dominates the issue of CEO turno-
ver in many cases that have been studied previous-
ly. 
Other theories used in this study are the equity 
theory versus expectancy theory. Traditionally, 
payment motivation can be explained using two 
theories, equity theory and expectancy theory (Ellig 
2007). Equity theory (theory of justice) predicts that 
individuals will improve the performance if they 
believe that the level of payment they receive is 
bigger than the outer, and vice versa, the perfor-
mance will decrease if they believe that the level of 
payment is lower than the performance they have 
given. 
In formulating the Equity Theory, Adams in 
Lindquist (1995) explains that the executives feel 
confident when the compensation they receive is 
not in accordance with the performance they have 
given. Consequently, they can dramatically decide 
to leave the company. Explanation of justice theory 
is supported by expectancy theory, which explains 
that individuals will increase their output in the 
expectation to receive increased payment. In the 
case of executives, if the individual does not receive 
a consistent increase to the improved performance 
she or he given, the individual (by using the theory 
of justice) would likely lower their performance or 
find a new job. 
Porter and Lawler Model (1968): Porter and 
Lawler model offers inspires the researchers to cov-
er up some weaknesses of Expectancy theory that 
has been developed by Vromm (1964). In this case, 
Porter and Lawler model is consistent with Vroom 
expectation model, of which main idea is to pro-
pose that employee motivation depends on: (1) the 
extent of benefits received by certain employees, 
and (2) the belief of the employees towards the re-
wards they receive due to their performance in the 
company. This model is a model that underlies the 
thinking about relationship among performance, 
compensation, satisfaction, and perception of the 
fairness of reward received by employees (includ-
ing the CEO). 
Labor market theory for executive: Kaplan 
(1998) explains that market will pay a CEO who has 
a special talent with a higher price because she or 
he is considered capable to take the company ahead 
of the competition in the product market. Labor 
market is said to work if its three functions work 
such as the presence of tasks control delegation, 
compensation that is built in accordance with the 
purpose of the company owner, and the last func-
tion is taking into account the performance of the 
executive career ladder. 
Personality theory is an important theory for 
explaining the effect of personality on the relation-
ship of compensation on CEO turnover. Personality 
theory is a branch of psychology that focuses on a 
coherent picture of a person and the main process 
of her or his psychological development; investi-
gates individual differences (how a person can be 
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different from each other); and investigates human 
nature (how people behave) (Boeree 1997: 6). Jung 
(1934 - in Boeree 1997) offers a definition of perso-
nality as an innate privilege. 
 
Effect of Personality on the Relationship of Com-
pensation and CEO Turnover 
A study by Zimmerman (2008) explained that it is 
important to understand the relationship between 
personality types and the CEO turnover theoretical-
ly, because by doing so, it can also understand how 
certain personality types can affect the desire to 
leave the company. If the CEO turnover can be re-
duced, it is likely to have an impact on the efficien-
cy of the company cost, especially those related to 
recruitment and human resource development. A 
study by Salgado (2002) measures whether the Big-
Five can be a predictor of counterproductive beha-
viors, such as absenteeism, accidents, behavioral 
and turnover. In this study, Salgado found that 
conscientiousness, extroversion, openness, agreea-
bleness and emotional stability can predict turno-
ver. 
The meta–analysis result by Zimmerman 
(2008) has found that personality types have an 
impact on the desire and individual turnover. In 
the case, the Emotional Stability or Neuroticism is 
positively related to the desire to leave, while Con-
scientiousness and Agreeableness is negatively 
related to the turnover decision. Openness has, on 
the contrary, a positive direct effect on turnover, 
possibly because the individual that has this sort of 
personality is open to find a job in the new envi-
ronment (Hogan 1983), has a broad requirement 
(interest) (Costa and McCrae 1985; Fiske 1949) or 
easily switches orientation (Howarth 1976), in 
Zimmerman (2008). Extraversion has been found to 
have a correlation with the degree of 4% towards 
the turnover and, thus, it is not significant. It is pos-
sibly because Extraversion personality is an indi-
vidual who is good at communication, but does not 
have a good working ability. However, Zimmer-
man's finding is not consistent with the result of 
Barrick and Mount study (1991) which has found 
that personality has a weak correlation with the 
change, but it supports the finding of the research 
of Salgado (2002). 
This study re-examines a type of personality, 
but it uses it as a moderating variable in the effect 
of the CEO‟s perception on the compensation with 
the turnover. Personality used as it is referred to 
the types of personality built by McCrae and Costa 
(1987), known as The Big-Five Inventory, namely 
Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extra-
version, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. People 
with openness personality have a high motivation 
to learn new skills, and they will do well in the 
training (Barrick and Mounth 1991). Generally, 
openness personality is characterized by an apprec-
iation of art, emotion, adventure, unusual ideas, 
curiosity, and a variety of experiences. People with 
conscientiousness personality when they are al-
ready working (paid/hired) in a certain organiza-
tion, they do not only tend to perform well, but also 
have a strong motivation to achieve such perfor-
mance, lower the level of desire to move (Zimmer-
man 2008). Generally, conscientiousness personali-
ty is marked by a tendency to show self-discipline, 
act dutifully, aim for achievement; actions planned 
and unspontaneous personality. 
People with extraversion personality is often 
found to be happy in the workplace, which may be 
due to their success in building a good relationship 
and easiness to adapt to the people around them 
(Judge, Heller and Mount 2002). Generally, they are 
characterized by energetic behavior, having posi-
tive emotions, excitement, and a tendency to seek 
new challenges elsewhere. Individuals with agree-
ableness personality are tending to be loving and 
cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic 
to others. Agreeableness personality is marked by 
friendly or compassionate vs. cold or not good. 
People with neuroticism personality has a tendency 
to experience unpleasant emotions easily, such as 
anger, anxiety, depression, or vulnerability, Denis-
sen and Penke (2008), found a low sense of forgive-
ness (Ashton and Lee 2007), a negative influence, 
impaired thought and personality (McCrae and 
Costa 1997), being rigid over responsibility for 
project partner when having desire to achieve a 
goal (Holmes 2002), and a desire to dominate (Lie-
shout 2000). 
Big-Five personality is chosen in this study be-
cause this type of personality has also been used in 
previous studies in Indonesia. Research conducted 
by Widhiarso (2004) concluded that the shape of 
this personality is quite capable of measuring per-
sonality at manager level. By using the Big Five 
personality questionnaire, Widhiarso argued that 
the questionnaire is sufficiently qualified and con-
sistent to be applied in Indonesia (Widhiarso 2004). 
That is, although the instrument was built in the 
western countries, but it is relevant to be used to 
measure the personality type of the people in Indo-
nesia. The explanation is the reason of the Big Five 
personality used in this study. Hypothesis devel-
oped using the assumption of personality theory, 
equity theory and expectancy theory as well as the 
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result of previous studies, is as follows: 
H1: Personality has an effect on the impact of 
CEO‟s perception on the amount of compensation 
received and CEO turnover that occurs voluntarily. 
Study by Linden, Nijenhuis and Bakker (2010) 
separately examined each dimension of the Big-
Five Personality. Their study compared the rela-
tionship of the performance of each personality 
dimension. Study by Linden et al. (2010) found that 
Openness and conscientiousness are relatively 
strong predictors of performance. Zimmerman 
(2008) also mentioned about the problem of mu-
tually exclusive of each personality. Hence explicit-
ly, Zimmerman constructed and tested hypotheses 
for each of the big five personality types. 
In reality, the existence of five types of perso-
nality is not mutually exclusive in individual self. 
There is only a certain type of personality that will 
dominate the next person and the individual tends 
to the personality. However, referring to previous 
studies, our study will also hypothesis and examine 
the Big-Five Personality separately. Figure 1 shows 
the existence of five types of personality as mutual-
ly exclusive. 
 
(a) Openness (“O”): Generally, openness personali-
ty is characterized by an appreciation of art, emo-
tion, adventure, unusual ideas, curiosity, and a 
variety of experiences. People with this personality 
have a high motivation to learn new skills, and they 
will do well in the training (Barrick and Mounth 
1991). Yet they also have more ability to adapt 
when entering a new environment, easy to get new 
information, build new relationships, and quickly 
adjust themselves in a new type of jobs (Wanberg 
and Kammeyer 2000). People having personality 
"O" are more open to find a job in a new environ-
ment (Hogan 1983), have a broad requirement (in-
terest) (Costa and McCrae 1985; Fiske 1949), or easi-
ly switch orientation (Howarth 1976), therefore this 
personality is said to be able to affect directly on 
turnover (in Zimmerman 2008). Barrick and Mouth 
(1991) found people with "O" are highly relevant to 
people who have a high social interaction. 
Another proponents are Denissen and Penke 
(2008) who explained that personality "O" has a cha-
racteristic, capable of handling problems with li-
mited information and uncertain future (Holmes 
2002; Lieshout 2000), has high intellectuality (McA-
dams 1992; McAdams and Pal 2006), has brilliant 
ideas (Ashton and Lee 2007), and tends to have inva-
sion and intelligence in solving the problem. For 
example, Sherman and Funder (2009) have found 
some significant things of people having personality 
“O”, such as the ability to speak fluently, expressing 
opinions well, interesting facial expression and 
voice, critical, and have high levels of enthusiasm 
and energy. Zimmerman (2008) found a positive 
relationship between personalities "O" with execu-
tives‟ turnover in the company. Therefore, if the 
CEO having personality "O" is offered to work in a 
new company with a better compensation value, it is 
very likely that redeployment will occur. 
H1.1: Openness to Experience reinforces the impact 
of CEO‟s perception on the compensation received 
and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 
(b) Conscientiousness ("C"): Personality "C" is 
marked by a tendency to show self-discipline, act 
dutifully, aim for achievement; actions planned and 
unspontaneous personality. Zimmerman (2008) has 
explained that people with personality "C" when 
they are already working (paid/hired) in a certain 
organization, they do not only tend to perform 
well, but also have a strong motivation to achieve 
such performance, lower the level of desire to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  
First Hypotheses Model 
Personality: 
Openness 
Conscientiousness 
Extraversion 
Agreeableness 
Neuroticism 
+ - 0 - + 
CEO‟s perception on 
compensation 
 
CEO‟s desire to leave 
voluntarily 
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move. Negative relationship was found by Zim-
merman on the relationship between personality 
"C" and a turnover in the company. Furthermore, 
people with personality “C" is also related to indi-
viduals that have an orientation in career achieve-
ment and long-term career satisfaction (Judge and 
Higgins 1999). 
People having personality "C" are confident 
that they can perform well in the company and in 
the long run will achieve success in career. Such as 
the study by Denissen and Penke (2008) associated 
with the personality of "C", some of the attributes 
inherent in this type of personality are task-
oriented personality (Ashton and Lee 2007), having 
ability to work reliably and everlasting commit-
ment (Buss 1996), more long-term oriented (Nettle 
2006), and can be trusted and having determination 
(Hogan 1996). According to the basic characteristics 
inherent in people having personality "C" above, 
individuals that are dominated by this type of per-
sonality consider a longer-term career compared to 
short-term compensation consideration. 
H1.2: Conscientiousness weakens the impact of 
CEO's perception on the amount of compensation 
received and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 
(c) Extraversion ("E"): Personality "E" is generally 
characterized by energetic behavior, having posi-
tive emotions, excitement, and a tendency to seek 
new challenges elsewhere. The most interesting 
characteristic of people with the "E" is that they are 
often found to be happy in the workplace, due to 
possibly their success in building a good relation-
ship and easiness to adapt to the people around 
them (Judge, Heller and Mount 2002). However, 
people with type "E" are not always happy at all 
works, especially the work that eventually will de-
prive their intensity in social interaction (Judge, 
Martocchio and Thoresen 1997). People with type 
"E" are willing to lose their jobs for a challenge in a 
new place and for their social interaction. 
Characteristics of personality "E" are also de-
scribed in the study by Sherman and Funder (2009). 
Their study has found that people with type "E" 
have a tendency in their personality to show their 
ability in society, show their interpersonal styles, be 
critical, active in talking, articulate and fluent, and 
keep a distance with a partner. This shows that the 
personality of "E" tends to be easily accepted in a 
new place. Zimmerman (2008) found that extraver-
sion has been found very low correlation as many 
as 0.04 with the turnover and it is not significant. 
These findings indicate that personality “E” does 
not take into consideration the compensation value 
when deciding to leave voluntarily. Especially for 
personality “E”, the theory becomes irrelevant used 
in the relationship between personality and the 
desire to leave the company voluntarily. 
Furthermore, when considering other characte-
ristics, as shown in Figure 1, the figure of type "E" 
tends to want to be in a new place, to show his abil-
ity in the new social environment and it is not due 
to a consideration on compensation in the compa-
ny. Any compensation received by people with 
personality "E", as long as they do not see any new 
challenge to explore their own capabilities, then the 
decision to leave voluntarily may still occur. 
H1.3: Extraversion does not affect the impact of 
CEO‟s perception on the amount of the compensa-
tion received and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 
(d) Agreeableness ("A"). Personality "A" is marked 
by friendly or being compassionate vs. cold or not 
good. Individuals with personality "A" tend to be 
loving and cooperative rather than suspicious and 
antagonistic to others. The study by Denissen and 
Penke (2008) shows characteristics inherent in the 
personality type "A", which are having a sense of 
forgiveness and a high compassion (Ashton and 
Lee 2007), a high desire to cooperate (Buss 1996; 
Holmes 2002), and not antagonistic to others 
(McCrae and Costa,1997). 
Sherman and Funder (2009) found behaviors 
dominating personality "A", such as behaving in a 
good way and showing hospitality, helping others 
at work consistently and not depending on mood 
(Ilies, Scott, and Judge 2006), having high empathy 
and thus having tendency to repay the goodness 
given to them (Skarlicki, Folger and Tesluk 1999). 
People with personality "A" were also found to 
correlate negatively on labor turnover (Zimmerman 
2008). 
This might be due to a good character, being 
friendly, calm, forgiving, coordinative, and enjoy-
ing working in the company, as described in Figure 
1 about personality "A" and other studies. People 
with personality "A" do not have more demands, 
and can accept the policies made by the company. 
Hence, CEO with personality "A" is not easy to de-
cide to leave the company if their performance is 
rewarded with a relatively low value of compensa-
tion. 
H1.4: Agreeableness weakens the impact of CEO‟s 
perception on the amount of compensation re-
ceived and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 
(e) Neuroticism ("N"): Personality "N" has a ten-
dency to experience unpleasant emotions easily, 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 18, No. 1, August – November 2015, pages 213 – 230 
219 
such as anger, anxiety, depression, or vulnerability. 
In BFI dimension, type "N" generally has the high-
est value of unwanted aspects. The study of Denis-
sen and Penke (2008) on personality "N", found a 
low sense of forgiveness (Ashton and Lee 2007), a 
negative influence, impaired thought and personal-
ity (McCrae and Costa 1997), being rigid over re-
sponsibility for project partner when having desire 
to achieve a goal (Holmes 2002), and a desire to 
dominate (Lieshout 2000). Basically, people with 
personality "N" are difficult to establish and main-
tain relationships with others. 
When associated with the desire to leave vo-
luntarily, the result of study done by Zimmerman 
(2008) found that personality type "N" had an im-
pact on the desire and individual turnover perso-
nality. In the issue of this study, personality "N" 
was positively related to the desire to leave volun-
tarily. It also becomes the basis of the assumption 
to predict that when a CEO with personality "N" 
receives compensation that is not in accordance 
with her or his expectations, then the desire to leave 
the company will be even greater. 
H1.5: Neuroticism reinforces the impact of CEO‟s 
perception on the amount of the compensation re-
ceived and voluntary CEO turnover. 
 
The Relationship between Compensation and 
Voluntary CEO Turnover 
Research in the area of the relationship between 
compensation and the CEO turnover is not yet get-
ting its conclusiveness. Some studies support the 
labor market theory, explaining that the talented 
manpower will be offered a higher compensation 
and thus it will lead to higher labor turnover execu-
tives. However, some studies do not support. For 
example a study on relationship issues of compen-
sation on CEO turnover has been done by Conyon 
and Nicolitsas (1998), related to payment of the 
CEO and the CEO turnover. The important ques-
tion of their study was whether the labor market 
for top executives worked? In this study, Conyon 
and Nicolitsas found payments received by execu-
tives in small and medium-sized enterprises were 
lower when being compared to large companies 
and this issue led to the soar of CEO turnover in 
these companies. 
Many subsequent studies examined the rela-
tionship between compensation and the turnover. 
The study of Chakraborty and Sheikh (2009) pro-
vided a finding that incentive and CEO turnover 
were two related things. However, this was highly 
variable, depending on how much the CEO‟s own-
ership toward the equity of the company. The re-
sult of this study suggested that the strength of a 
great incentive might increase the strength signal of 
the performance measurement and subsequently 
pushes CEO turnover. Furthermore, the study by 
Eriksson (2005), found that company's performance 
has affected the growth of the incentives for top 
managers. In poorly performing companies, it was 
found that CEO turnover had been increased. This 
finding seemed to indicate that CEO turnover was 
due to a worsening company's performance and 
had an impact on the compensation received by 
executives and subsequently the compensation 
became the determinant of CEO turnover. Prelimi-
nary studies conducted by Fich and White (2003), 
also suggested that CEO‟s compensation which 
tends to be higher will result in the lower CEO 
turnover. Proper interpretation of these results is 
that mutual interlock is an entrenchment for CEO, 
and high compensation and low CEO turnover are 
the form of this entrenchment. 
Takahashi (2006) did not found any literature 
that investigated the relationship between compen-
sation and the possibility of CEO turnover. Takaha-
shi assessed that previous studies had only focused 
on the partial relationship between company‟s per-
formance and compensation, or company‟s perfor-
mance on CEO turnover only. Takahashi's study 
estimated the existence of negative relationship 
between the form and the amount of compensation 
with the possibility of CEO turnover. Moreover, 
they have found that the amount and the form of 
compensation have a significant impact on the pos-
sibility of CEO turnover. 
An article written by Hadlock and Lumer 
(1997) found a very less sensitive changing on the 
top management toward the performance of the 
company from their estimation in the modern 
company. This finding has been robust even after 
the potential of changing from time to time was 
controlled by the board composition, ownership 
structure, firm size, firm age, the frequency of the 
founder of the company involved in the company, 
and the variability of stock returns. Hadlock and 
Lumer study is once again emphasizing that the 
decision of CEO turnover is not directly deter-
mined by the performance of the company. There is 
one value that will determine the CEO to decide to 
leave the company, and it is not the performance of 
the company. 
Sometimes, companies are not willing to fire 
the manager of the company directly when the 
company's performance has declined. Payment to 
the manager has become a consequence of the ina-
bility of the manager to enhance the growth of the 
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company. This payment finally becomes a consid-
eration of the manager to decide her or his exis-
tence in the company. Signal of the relationship 
between compensation and CEO turnover also ex-
isted implicitly in the study of Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) which stated that as predicted in the agency 
theory, compensation policy would depend on the 
change in shareholder wealth. Empirical evidence 
they found was that a payment to the CEO was 
positively related and was significant with the 
wealth of its shareholders, and subsequently the 
probability of CEO turnover would be negatively 
related and significant to changes in shareholders‟ 
wealth. In fact, the study of Jensen and Murphy did 
not related directly with compensation and CEO 
turnover, but the two tests made by them implicitly 
explained that the escalation of company‟s equity 
had an impact on the compensation received by the 
CEO, and further (as described Hadlock and Lumer 
1997), compensation would be the consideration of 
the CEO to leave voluntarily. 
The issue of compensation and turnover re-
mains a hot topic. Compensation on a new CEO 
was found to increase compared with the previous 
CEO left the company (Blackwell et al. 2007; Elsaid 
and Davidson 2009). Blackwell found an increase in 
the level of compensation occurred at the sample of 
voluntarily turnover, and Elsaid and Davidson 
found an increase in the compensation amounted 
to 69%. Research conducted Core et al. (2008) only 
found evidence of a weak relationship between the 
reduction in the level of compensation to executives 
and increased CEO turnover, from observation 
conducted on 11,000 articles published from 1994 to 
2002 year. However, a study conducted by Perry 
(2000) showed that an increase in equity-based 
compensation director turned out to be a positive 
impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover under-
performing (see Brick et al. 2006). Nevertheless, the 
company's stock performance and the size of the 
company grew significantly in companies that pro-
vide high compensation compared with companies 
that provide relatively low compensation (Eisfeldt 
and Kühnen 2013). The research results indicate 
that the compensation received by former CEO 
may trigger change of CEO. Key persons are com-
pensated at a high level will optimize its ability to 
enhance shareholder value. From these explana-
tions, this study builds a second hypothesis as fol-
lows: 
Ha2: (ceteris paribus) the compensation received by 
the CEO is negatively related to CEO turnover. 
Figure 2 describes the second hypothesis. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Population 
The data on CEO turnover were collected manually 
by tracing the names of the Director (as research 
population) stated on the company's annual report, 
from 429 firms. To determine whether CEO turno-
ver was involuntary or coercive, this research ex-
amined the growth of the company in which the 
CEO turnover occurred after the CEO had served a 
minimum of three consecutive years. If the growth 
had been good (positive, an average of three years 
when the CEO officiated) then it was called volun-
tary turnover. Meanwhile, the respondents of this 
study were the entire CEOs who worked in com-
panies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
 
Research Data 
This study used primary and secondary data in 
accordance with the needs of the research design. 
The primary data were those of CEO‟s perception 
on the compensation, their desire to leave volunta-
rily in connection with the use of compensation 
considerations, and the data of CEO‟s personality. 
Primary data was collected using a questionnaire 
via mail survey. A total of 10 of statements were 
used to obtain information related to the CEO‟s 
perception on the compensation and their intention 
to leave the company, and 54 statements for perso-
nality. 
The pattern of statements drafting was delibe-
rately designed not in line with the aim to ensure 
the seriousness of the respondents in understand-
ing each of the statements. The scale used for all 
statements was 1 to 5, where 1 represented "strong-
ly disagree" and 5 for "strongly agree". Secondary 
data used was the data of the company‟s perfor-
mance (net income, stock price, and total assets), as 
well as data of CEO turnover. For compensation 
data, in addition to data collection using a hand-
collected method, this study also used the informa-
tion released by Bisnis Indonesia, in the IDX Watch 
book. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Second Hypothesis Model 
Compensation 
Voluntary CEO 
Turnover 
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Econometric Model 
The main hypothesis of this study stating that per-
sonality affects the impact of the CEO‟s perception 
on the compensation toward CEO turnover has 
been tested by using equation 1. Because the perso-
nalities used in the study consist of five personality 
types, the first test of this hypothesis will be per-
formed 5 times, each for personality type according 
to the derivation of hypotheses. Any kind of perso-
nality test is denoted by number 1, and otherwise it 
is 0. 
Turn= α0 + α1PerComp + α2Person + α3PerComp * Per-
son + εi.   (1) 
Description:  
Turn=turnover, PerComp (perceptions of compensa-
tion), Person is personality. 
Furthermore, the second hypothesis which 
reads: (ceteris paribus) the compensation received 
by the CEO is negatively related to CEO turnover, 
has been tested by using equation 2. Three control 
variables which have been used are due to a con-
sideration that the theory and the results of pre-
vious studies have found a connection between 
CEO turnover and accounting performance and 
market performance. ROA was found to correlate 
negatively and significantly, at least in the research 
of Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Virany et 
al. (1992), and Shen (2000). Meanwhile, earnings 
were found negative and significant in the study of 
Engle et al. (2003), and DeFond and Hung (2003). 
Stock Price was found to be negative and signifi-
cant in the study of Warner et al. (1988), Beatty and 
Zajac (1987), Engle et al. (2003), DeFond and Hung 
(2003), and Fee and Hadlock (2004). While ROA 
was associated with the turnover in the study of 
Huson et al. (2001). 
Turn1,0 = α0 + α1Comp + α2Return + α3Earnings + 
α4ROA + εi. (2) 
Description:  
Turn=turnover (1 for voluntary turnover, 0 for no 
turnover), Comp= compensation. 
 
Research Variables 
To provide better information, the research variable 
will be described for each hypothesis. 
 
The First Hypothesis: 
Dependent variable: The data of CEO turnover is 
based on the perception obtained using a question-
naire on CEO‟s desire to leave voluntarily on the 
perception form. There were 6 statements used to 
gain information related to the CEO‟s desire to 
leave the company with consideration of compen-
sation. 
Independent variable: The independent variables 
are perceived over the amount of compensation 
received from the company's CEO. This data was 
obtained through questionnaires. 
Moderating variable: Personality is the moderating 
variable in which, in the area of research on com-
pensation and CEO turnover earlier, it has not been 
found any test on the sensitivity between compen-
sation and the turnover with consideration of the 
CEO‟s personality. 
 
The Second Hypothesis: 
Dependent variable: CEO turnover in the second 
hypothesis is the real turnover, which occurs vo-
luntary. Determination of the voluntary uses the 
assumption that the change occurs only if there are 
any positive growth of companies on three years 
before turnover. Voluntary turnover testing used in 
this study is becoming originality research. 
Independent variable: The compensation variables 
consist of two types, each secondary data is derived 
from the total of remuneration earned from com-
pany annual reports, and accumulated in the 
JSX/IDX Watch issued by Bisnis Indonesia. The 
primary data is the compensation based on the 
CEO‟s perception that currently serves or who cur-
rently serves as a CEO and previously was a CEO 
of another company. The portion of the remunera-
tion distribution until generating CEO‟s compensa-
tion will be traced from the information disclosure 
of the Board of Commissioners and from report of 
the General Meeting of Shareholders. 
Control variables. The control variables preferred 
are the company‟s performance that has been used 
in previous studies and has a significant impact on 
CEO turnover, which consists of earnings, stock 
price, and ROA which are commonly used as two 
major indicators for measuring the performance of 
the company. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Research Data 
Primary Data: This study uses the actual respon-
dents, as well as the data on the voluntary CEO 
turnovers which have been obtained through a 
series of tests. Using performance indicator, it re-
sulted in a quite interesting finding. From a total of 
68 CEOs who had voluntarily changed, only six 
people who became CEOs of the new places, 2 as 
CEOs and the other 4 as parts of the management 
team and the board of commissioners and man-
agement team. 
Due to a reason of respondents‟ representation, 
this study eventually used a model of perception 
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built by Porter and Lawler (1968), which means 
that the entire CEOs of companies listed in Indone-
sia Stock Exchange became the respondents of the 
study. In Table 1, it shows the data of the respon-
dents of the study subsequently used to test the 
first hypothesis of this study. 
All respondents were given 445 questionnaires. 
The questionnaires returned were 68 or 15.2 %. This 
return rate is at the value of return level that gener-
ally occurs in every survey by post. From the 68 
questionnaires that were returned, there were 3 
questionnaires incomplete, while the other 4 were 
returned after more than 60 days waiting period. 
Thus, the final questionnaire which data can we use 
was derived from 61 respondents. 
Secondary Data: At the stage of secondary data 
acquisition, the names of the CEO from year to year 
in the period 1999-2009 were identified. The result 
of observation during the period of observation 
found a total of 429 turnovers that occurred during 
that period. CEO turnover traced the raw data in 
the same style as it had done on study of Lindria-
nasari and Hartono (2012), but this study con-
ducted additional tests in determining whether the 
CEO turnover is voluntary, i.e. by testing the per-
formance of the CEO's performance in the 3 years 
before the change occurs. 
Furthermore, the CEO that changed and pre-
viously had served for 3 years was then selected for 
a testing on the performance of the company when 
the CEO officiated. The difficulty of obtaining sec-
ondary data completeness eventually left a final 
sample of the study to test the second hypothesis 
only on 96 companies, consisting of 55 companies 
representing voluntary turnovers and 41 companies 
of control (Table 2). Meanwhile, the value of the 
compensation, which was originally designed to 
use the service of a professional institution in the 
Table 1 
Research Respondents for Primary Data 
Number of Questionnaires Sent to Total 
CEO of company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, by annual report 2010  443 
Others 19 
Total  458 
Number of questionnaires returned from:  
CEO of company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, by annual report 2010  51 
Others 17 
Total  68 
Invalid questionnaires returned from:  
CEO of company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, by annual report 2010  0 
Others:  
Incomplete 3 
Returned more than 60 days 4 
Final respondents 61 
 
Table 2 
Selection of Voluntary Turnover Sample 1999-2009 
Number of turnover that occurred on period 1999-2009 429 
Panel A: Testing of samples for voluntary CEO turnover  
CEO who has been working at least 3 years before turnover occurred than testing for Voluntary on 
period 1999-2009 
 
187 
CEO excluded because it is not voluntary turnover category 119 
Samples for voluntary CEO turnover*) 68 
Incompleteness compensation data  (13) 
55 
Panel B: Collecting data of control samples   
Control sample **) 71 
Incompleteness compensation data (30) 
 41 
Final sample***) 96 
*)  Voluntary CEO Turnover is determined by examining the growth of the company‟s performance and also data availability. 
**)  Control sample is a company that did not conduct turnover during the observed period and also data availability. 
***)  55 voluntary CEO turnover and 41 control sample. 
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field of compensation assessment in Indonesia 
(such as Bisnis Indonesia, Watson Towers, HR Por-
tal, and Human Capital Magazine), was then finally 
using remuneration data contained in the annual 
report and the IDX/IDX Watch Library published 
by Pustaka Bisnis Indonesia. 
The portion of special compensation distribu-
tion for the CEO applied a formula was created by 
using several references, such as information from 
the JSX Watch (2007) describing the distribution of 
the remuneration package of big companies in In-
donesia. The portion of the compensation distribu-
tion also considered what was described in the on-
line magazine released in 2009 and that was on 
http://indonesiacompanynews.wordpress.com, 
that: 
"The composition of the distribution uses the 
100 percent standard scheme for the chief ex-
ecutive, while the management receives a bo-
nus of 90 percent from the amount received by 
the chief executive. Chief commissionaire rece-
ives a bonus of 40 percent from the amount re-
ceived by the chief executive. Commissioner 
receives a bonus of 36 percent from the amount 
received by the chief executive and the secre-
tary of the Board of Commissioners receives a 
bonus of 15 percent from the amount received 
by the chief executive". 
Finally, the formula used in this study were: 
100% for the CEO; 95% for the Vice Director; 90% 
for the Director; 50% for the Chairman of the 
Commissioner; 45% for the Vice of the Commis-
sioner, 40 for the Commissioner; and 15% for the 
Secretary, of the amount received by the CEO. This 
distribution may not be consistent with the fact that 
it occurs in the company. But at least, this formula 
can give an idea of the amount of compensation 
received by the CEO in Indonesia. 
 
Validity Test and Reliability Test of the Ques-
tionnaire 
Validity test is intended to determine whether the 
instruments used were able to capture object of 
perceptions that is being measured, so that they 
can capture the actual respondents' perceptions. 
Therefore, the questionnaire should have been 
built as good as possible so that the result reflects 
the condition of the field. This study use Pearson 
correlation to measure the validity of the instru-
ment. The result obtained from the validity test 
showed that instruments that had been used were 
valid, with the correlation significance at the level 
0.05, others were even at the level of 0.01. As for 
the reliability test of the questionnaires, this study 
used a split half that was contained in SPSS. In the 
result of the data process, it was found that Cron-
bach alpha result was 0.867 with a correlation of 
0.493. This result indicated that the questionnaires 
used were reliable. Questionnaires with a good 
reliability will show a good consistency of the an-
swers. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
This study is important to provide a new point of 
view on the relationship between variable com-
pensation and CEO turnover. CEO is a subject 
chosen based on the consideration that the CEO is 
the key person in the company, and achieving the 
stability of the anticipated performance of the 
company against losing CEOs (especially the CEO 
who has specific expertise) absolutely must be 
done. As described Baron, Hannan and Burton 
(2001), the changing of important people in the 
company will lead to changes in the organization 
and further will ultimately have an impact on or-
ganizational performance. Furthermore, Zimmer-
man (2008) explains that the company is theoreti-
cally important to understand the relationship 
between personality types with CEO turnover due 
to the company's CEO to understand the personal-
ity types can anticipate that the CEO turnover can 
be reduced, and this will have an impact on cost 
efficiency. Therefore, this study tries to find the 
effect of the CEO's personality on their desire to 
leave the company voluntarily, when they are not 
satisfied with the compensation that they receive 
from the company. 
 
Testing and Discussion of the First Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis of this study states that perso-
nality affects the relationship between CEO‟s per-
ception on compensation toward voluntary CEO 
turnover. Overall, the finding obtained from statis-
tical test results has shown empirical evidence that 
the five factors of personality (the big five invento-
ry) which was first introduced by McCrae and Cos-
ta (1985; 1987), plays a role in influencing the CEO‟s 
perception on the amount of compensation they 
receive toward their desire to leave voluntarily. 
This study uses a significance level of 5% and a 
two-sided t-table= 2,000. The finding provides an 
important confirmation, why for all this time the 
results of research in the area of the relationship 
between compensation and CEO turnover using 
secondary data have not found consistent results. 
Table 3 is demographic data of respondents and 
Table 4 is summary of test result of personality as a 
moderating variable. 
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Openness to Experience Reinforces the Impact of 
CEO’s Perception on Compensation toward Vo-
luntary Turnover 
There is a significant result in the test result of per-
sonality type of openness to experience (O) which 
was expected to strengthen the CEO‟s desire to 
leave voluntarily when he was not satisfied with 
the value of the compensation received. Before in-
cluding personality as a moderating variable, t-test 
of the compensation based on the perception was 
0.794 with p-value was 0.430. Yet, after being mod-
erated by openness personality, the t-test of the 
moderating variable was 2.094 with p-value as 
much as 0.041. 
This finding explains that people who have a 
high curiosity have the intellectual, that are creative 
and open to new ideas, which have been the cha-
racteristics of people with the type of personality 
„openness‟, will be easy to decide to move to a new 
place when they are not satisfied with the compen-
sation they receive. This condition is very much in 
line with equity theory and expectancy theory, as 
well as the model of perception proposed by Potter 
and Lawler (1986). This result is also consistent 
with the results of the study done by Hogan (1983), 
Howarth (1976), and Zimmerman (2008). This find-
ing also becomes a reason to accept the hypothesis 
stating that openness to Experience reinforces the 
impact of CEO‟s perception on the compensation 
toward the turnover. 
 
Conscientiousness Weakens the Impact of CEO’s 
Perception on Compensation toward Voluntary 
Turnover 
Test result of conscientiousness personality type 
was predicted to weaken the desire of a CEO to 
leave the company when he was not satisfied with 
the value of the compensation received. It showed 
significant results. Before adding conscientiousness 
personality as a moderating variable, the t-test val-
ue of the compensation based on the perception 
was 0.474 with p-value of 0.638. Yet, after being 
moderated by conscientiousness personality, the t-
test of the moderating variable was -2.077 with p-
value of 0.042. 
This study successfully explains that people 
who have an organized way of life are systematic, 
results-oriented and tend to have the dependency 
Table 3 
Demographic Data of Respondents 
Respondents   Total 
Type of personality Openness 
Conscientiousness 
Extraversion 
Agreeableness 
Neuroticism 
3 
26 
13 
18 
1  
Educational background Engineering 
Economics 
Others 
n.a. 
19 
27 
6 
9 
Age < 40 y.a. 
40 - 50 y.a. 
50 - 60 y.a. 
> 60 
n.a. 
4 
17 
24 
7 
9 
 
Table 4 
Test Result of Personality as a Moderating Variable 
Personality  Adj. R Square  Coefficient t-test P-value 
 
Openness 
  
0.048 
Compensation 
Moderator 
0.100 
0.264 
 0.794 
2.094 
0.430 
0.041*) 
 
Conscientiousness 
  
0.037 
Compensation 
Moderator 
0.133 
-0.151 
 0.474 
-2.077 
0.638 
0.042*) 
 
Extraversion 
  
-0.021 
Compensation 
Moderator 
0.104 
0.059 
 0.796 
0.449 
0.429 
0.655 
 
Agreeableness 
  
0.000 
Compensation 
Moderator 
0.117 
-0.155 
 0.904 
-1.192 
0.370 
0.238 
 
Neuroticism 
  
0.002 
Compensation 
Moderator 
0.097 
0.161 
 0.751 
1.246 
0.456 
0.218 
Note: *) Significant level <5%. 
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character, which is the characteristic of people with 
the conscientiousness personality type, will not be 
easy to decide to move to a new place even though 
they may not satisfied with the compensation they 
receive. This finding is in line with the results of 
studies done by Zimmerman (2008), Judge and 
Higgins (1999). The finding has a strong reason to 
accept the hypothesis that conscientiousness wea-
kens the impact of CEO‟s perception on compensa-
tion toward the turnover. 
 
Extraversion does not Affect the Impact of CEO’s 
Perception on Compensation toward Voluntary 
Turnover 
Extraversion personality type that was predicted to 
have no effect on the CEO‟s desire to leave volunta-
rily when they was not satisfied with the value of 
the compensation received, was supported by a 
significant statistical test result. When the CEO‟s 
perception on the compensation they receive was 
regressed on their desire to leave voluntarily, the 
result statistically was found to be insignificant. 
Similar result was also found when extraversion 
moderated the relationship between the two. The 
finding of this study is consistent with the study of 
Zimmerman (2008). The test results showed that 
before including extraversion personality as a 
moderating variable, the t-test of the compensation 
based on perception was 0.796 with p-value of 
0.429. However, after being moderated by extraver-
sion personality, the t-test of the moderating varia-
ble was 0.449 with p -value of 0.665. 
 
Agreeableness Weakens the Impact of CEO’s Per-
ception on Compensation toward Voluntary 
Turnover 
The next test performed on agreeableness is also 
consistent with the prediction of the theory. Agree-
ableness shows its ability to weaken the impact of 
CEO‟s perception on the compensation they receive 
toward the desire to move to another company. 
In other words, the CEO having this personali-
ty did not see the amount of compensation they 
received as a major consideration to be loyal to the 
company. Although agreeableness was not signifi-
cant statistically as moderating variable, but its 
function in weakening the impact of CEO‟s percep-
tion on the compensation they receive toward the 
desire to leave voluntarily was clearly visible. Be-
fore adding agreeableness personality as a mod-
erating variable, the t-test of compensation based 
on perception was 0.904 with p-value of 0.370. 
However, after being moderated by agreeableness, 
the t-test was -1.192 with p-value of 0.239. This 
finding becomes a strong reason to reject the hypo-
thesis stating that conscientiousness weakens the 
impact of CEO‟s perception on compensation to-
ward the turnover, or in other words, this hypothe-
sis is rejected. 
 
Neuroticism Reinforces the Impact of CEO Turn-
over on Compensation toward Voluntary Turno-
ver 
The test result of this hypothesis suggested that 
neuroticism, as a moderating variable, was capable 
in reinforcing the desire to leave voluntarily when 
the compensation received by the CEO was consi-
dered unfair. Statistically, before adding neurotic-
ism personality as a moderating variable, t-test of 
compensation based on perception was 0.751 with 
p-value of 0.456. However, after being moderated 
by neuroticism, the t-test of the moderating varia-
ble turned was 1.246 with p-value level of 0.219. 
Although this result was not statistically signif-
icant and hypothesis associated with Neuroticism 
was rejected, theoretically, neuroticism successfully 
demonstrated its function as a factor that streng-
thened the impact of perception on the amount of 
compensation toward the desire to leave voluntari-
ly. This finding is in line with the result of studies 
done by Zimmerman (2008) in a meta-analysis, 
which found that neuroticism personality type had 
an impact on the desire and personality of the indi-
vidual turnover in the company. 
Jackson and Rothstein (1991) conducted a re-
view on a meta-analysis related with the personali-
ty measurement to predict the performance of one's 
job, and stated that it was important for companies 
to measure, recognize and understand the perso-
nality types of the employees, proven empirically 
in this study. Understanding the personality type of 
the individual who will be the key person in the 
company becomes a very important part to provide 
the right treatment in accordance with the perso-
nality of the person. 
Suggestion from previous researchers (like 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988; Datta and Guthrie 
1994; and Fredrickson et al. 1988) is to include more 
factors inherent with the CEO individual. In this 
case, this study has given empirical evidence for 
the development of the research topic in the field of 
CEO turnover that occurs voluntarily. 
 
Testing and Discussion of the Second Hypothesis 
Before discussing the results of testing for each hy-
pothesis, the following descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 5. Statistics present descriptive 
information about the data set used in the testing. 
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This information is useful to see, in brief, the data 
structure. 
This study further conducted a testing on 
compensation, accounting data and market data as 
factors related to the issue of voluntary CEO turno-
ver. The testing of the second hypothesis uses logis-
tic regression, because the dependent variable is 
dichotomous or binary variable. Kleinbaum (2002) 
stated that if the value of (z) is between 0 and 1, the 
use of logistic regression is a popular tool. The de-
pendent variable used in this study is denoted to be 
1 and 0, which is 1 for CEO turnover and 0 for no 
change. 
Overall, the result of the logit regression for 
data used in this study shows the omnibus test val-
ue of the chi-square test that had a very strong sig-
nificance, each with p-value of 0.001. The value of 
chi-square omnibus test of model coefficients that 
was less than p= 0.05 made the null hypothesis of 
the study that stated that there was no relationship 
between the independent variable on the depen-
dent rejected. Furthermore, the effect of the inde-
pendent variable was indicated by the value of Na-
gelkerke's R square as much as 0.24, and to recog-
nize the partial value of Nagelkerke's R, it was de-
scribed by Wald along with its significance. The test 
result of the model for the second hypothesis using 
logit regression shows that this model was good 
enough, so that an explanation of each variable on 
the dependent could be done. 
Overall result of the analysis is described in 
Table 6 as well as the characteristics and test result 
that have been performed in this study, including 
the sample. Statistical results show that compensa-
tion is not strong enough to explain its relationship 
toward turnover. On the other hand, earnings, re-
turns and ROA, which are incorporated into the 
model as control variables, are supported as ante-
cedent models of turnover statistically; compensa-
tion was significant at 0.15 levels, while the earn-
ings, returns and ROA are significant at p ≤ 0.05 
levels. This result also strengthens the first hypo-
thesis of this study that personality is an important 
factor that affects the relationship between the 
amounts of the compensation received by the CEO 
toward his turnover that occurs voluntarily. 
Compensation: Statistical analysis shows that 
p-value of compensation is 0.154 indicating that 
voluntary turnover is not caused by compensation, 
but because there must be other factors that influ-
enced it. Value of B= 0.000 and 2.036 for Wald, has 
strengthened the argument that the value of com-
pensation received by the CEO in a big company in 
Indonesia is not a factor that causes voluntary CEO 
turnover. This result also provides a reason that 
this study did not have a statistically sufficient rea-
son to support the second hypothesis assuming: 
(ceteris paribus) the compensation received by the 
CEO is negatively related to CEO turnover. In other 
words, the second hypothesis of this study was not 
supported by using 96 data of large companies in 
Indonesia during the period of observation from 
1999 to 2009. 
Earnings were found to be significant (the 
probabilistic value was 0.017) for turnover that oc-
curred voluntarily. A negative relationship was 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Samples Mean Max Min Std. Dev 
Panel A: Main Variables      
Turnover 96  0.4271 1.00 .00 .49725 
Compensation 96 1.3789 1.7217 0 2.176 
Panel B: Control Variable      
Earnings (in millions) 96 601.510 34.500 (239) 6.236 
Return 96 6.65 95 -308 38 
ROA 96 5.21 37 -16 9 
Age 96 1.8646 3.00 1.00 .59152 
 
Table 6 
Characteristics of Samples and the Test Results 
 Variables Wald B p-value. 
N=96 
0 = 41 
1 = 55 
Logit test 
Compensation 
Earnings 
Return 
ROA 
Age 
2.036 
5.745 
3.890 
3.985 
.039 
.000 
-.000 
-.054 
-.106 
-.076 
.154 
.017*) 
.049*) 
.046*) 
.842 
Note: *) Significant level <5%. 
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shown with the value of B= -000 and Wald 5.749 
indicating that a low net profit would encourage 
CEO turnover in the company. Overall, earnings 
were predicted to have a negative relationship with 
turnover. Thus, this result also supports previous 
studies which have found that the lower earnings 
obtained, the higher CEO turnover occurs in a par-
ticular company. The test that was conducted on 
the relationship between stock returns and the 
turnover played a role when the change occurred in 
the company, with a significance of 0.049. Sup-
ported also by the value of B= -0.054 and Wald 3.89, 
overall statistical result indicated that CEO turno-
ver occurred when the average of the return earned 
on investments made by the owner was lower. 
The significance of ROA is at 0.046 showing 
that this variable is a factor that determines the 
turnover. The value of B= -0.106 and Wald 3.985 
have reinforced the signal that accounting perfor-
mance is a factor to be considered when companies 
make critical decisions. This finding supports the 
previous study done by Shen (2000). The last is the 
control variables testing, whether the age of the 
firm had a relationship with the voluntary turno-
ver, shows no significant result. It is evident that 
the significance of age is at 0.843 indicating this 
variable could not be a factor that determines the 
turnover. This result is also supported by the value 
of Wald of 0.039. However, the relationship is still 
consistent with the evidence as it is predicted (B= -
0.106). This finding indicates that CEO turnover is 
more common to take place in relatively new com-
panies compared to a company that has been estab-
lished, although the relationship is not very mea-
ningful. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATION 
In general, it is evident that each personality which 
has been positioned as a supported moderating 
variable is in line with the theory. Openness and 
conscientiousness personality types have an impor-
tant role in influencing the relationship between 
CEO‟s perception on the compensation they receive 
and their desire to leave voluntarily. On one hand, 
conscientiousness will weaken CEO‟s desire to 
leave the company, while openness strengthens the 
relationship between the two. On the other hand, 
extraversion personality as it has been predicted 
would not affect the impact of CEO‟s perception on 
the compensation toward the turnover. It is in fact 
also supported. This condition is in line with the 
prediction done earlier while providing empirical 
evidence why the findings of studies that examined 
the relationship between compensation and turno-
ver have not been conclusive. 
This evidence is in line with the prediction 
done earlier that, at least, there is one type of per-
sonality that dominated CEO‟s desire when decid-
ing something important in their career, which is 
leaving the company voluntarily. Meanwhile, 
extraversion personality, as what has been pre-
dicted that it does not affect the impact of CEO‟s 
perception on the compensation toward CEO turn-
over, is also supported. 
The next evidence is related to the CEO‟s per-
sonality as a moderating variable, which affects the 
relationship between CEO‟s perception on the 
compensation toward voluntary turnover. This has 
also answered the findings that have failed to sup-
port that the amount of compensation (in remune-
ration). It is the trigger towards the turnover. The 
result of this study provides an important finding 
that not all CEOs will decide to leave the company 
when the compensation factor becomes a major 
issue to be considered. CEO‟s personality plays an 
important role in decision to leave the company, 
even when the compensation they receive is rela-
tively smaller than other CEOs do. 
Further affirmation is concerned with the rela-
tionship between compensation and turnover indi-
cates that compensation is not strong enough to 
explain voluntary CEO turnover. Only the control 
variables included in the model (earnings, returns 
and ROA) can explain statistically the relationship 
between compensation and turnover. The result of 
these two tests (hypothesis one and two) indicates 
that compensation is not strong enough to explain 
voluntary turnover. 
All in all, it can be concluded that personality 
plays an important role in the CEO‟s consideration 
to leave the company voluntarily when compensa-
tion becomes an issue to be considered. Hence, this 
study successfully provides contribution to the 
development of the labor market theory for execu-
tives. Not all CEOs in Indonesia consider compen-
sation an important reason for deciding to leave the 
company. Interviews to six executives also provide 
important information that they have loyalty to the 
company that pays them, especially when they are 
given the authority to manage the company in ac-
cordance with their competence. However, limita-
tion of the compensation value at certain limit liter-
ally determines their comfort in working. 
This study has limitations such as it was not 
easy to determine the right portion of the remune-
ration package distribution published by the com-
pany. The distribution formulation done was only 
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based on the professional consideration according 
to the portion of several companies. Subjectivity 
remained there, although the objectivity was still 
pursued. Therefore, the compensation value used 
in the test could not be separated from bias. Anoth-
er limitation is the difficulty to determine whether 
the CEO turnover was voluntary. 
This study uses a measure of growth with cau-
tious consideration. Three variables representing 
each of the accounting and financial resources used 
such as Assets, Revenue, and PBV that were ex-
pected to represent a measure of performance as-
sessment. New findings in this issue are still very 
much needed studies on the CEO compensation 
have not been considerably done in Indonesia. 
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